In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected." Of the same opinion is the marquis Beccarari. History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world. Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one.
The Anti-, federalist, papers
This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire. Let us now proceed to enquire, as i at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, business it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state? If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot writing succeed over a country of such immense extent. Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, i shall content myself with"ng only two. The one is the baron de montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. "It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and.
For all laws made, in pursuance of this presentation constitution, are the supreme lay of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding. — by such a law, the government of a particular state might be overturned at one stroke, and thereby be deprived of every means of its support. It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them. But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way.
One inferior court must be established, i presume, in each state, at least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts. These courts will be, in themselves, totally online independent of the states, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the powers. How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to do away all idea of confederated states, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into legs one general government, it is impossible to say. The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite indefinite?, and may. Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the state debt, may the congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary.
No state can emit paper money — lay any duties, or imposts, on imports, or exports, but by consent of the congress; and then the net produce shall be for the benefit of the United States: the only mean therefore left, for any state. Every one who has thought on the subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can be collected in any country, by direct taxes, when the foederal government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the. Without money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle away, and, as before observed, their powers absorbed in that of the general government. It might be here shewn, that the power in the federal legislative, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and their controul over the militia, tend, not only to a consolidation of the government, but the destruction. — i shall not, however, dwell upon these, as a few observations upon the judicial power of this government, in addition to the preceding, will fully evince the truth of the position. The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution.
Publius Valerius Publicola - wikipedia, the free
— the government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as much one complete government as that of New-York or Massachusetts, has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, and annex penalties, with respect to every object to which it extends,. So far therefore as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is still left to the states, but a little attention to the powers vested in the general government, will convince every candid man, that. The powers of the general legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance — there is nothing valuable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is within its power. It has authority to make laws which will affect the lives, the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the constitution or laws of any state, in any way prevent or impede the full and complete execution of every power. The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; — there is no limitation to this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which those taxes, and duties shall be applied, may be said.annual
No state legislature, or any power in the state governments, have any more to do in carrying this into effect, than the authority of one state has to do with that of another. In the business therefore of laying and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, plan and that of one entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that the authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or at least will in process of time draw all other after. This cannot fail of being the case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this constitution, to the late state? Governments, on this article of raising money.
You may rejoice in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming filled with freemen, who will assert the dignity of human nature. You may solace yourselves with the idea, that society, in this favoured land, will fast advance to the highest point of perfection; the human mind will expand in knowledge and virtue, and the golden age be, in some measure, realised. But if, on the other hand, this form of government contains principles that will lead to the subversion of liberty — if it tends to establish a despotism, or, what is worse, a tyrannic aristocracy; then, if you adopt it, this only remaining assylum for. Momentous then is the question you have to determine, and you are called upon by every motive which should influence a noble and virtuous mind, to examine it well, and to make up a wise judgment. It is insisted, indeed, that this constitution must be received, be it ever so imperfect. If it has its defects, it is said, they can be best amended when they are experienced.
But remember, when the people once part with power, they can seldom or never resume it again but by force. Many instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily increased the powers of their rulers; but few, if any, in which rulers have willingly abridged their authority. This is a sufficient reason to induce you to be careful, in the first instance, how you deposit the powers of government. With these few introductory remarks, i shall proceed to a consideration of this constitution : The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the best for the United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one executive and judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen confederated republics, under the direction and controul of a supreme. This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate. This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is declared "that the congress shall have power to make all laws.
Federalists conservative thought and Policy
In this situation, i trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to lead the minds of the people to a wise and prudent determination, cannot fail of being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate part of the community. Encouraged by this consideration, i have been induced to offer my thoughts upon the present important crisis of our public affairs. Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their political concerns. We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these United-States are held together, and the want of sufficient energy in our present confederation, to manage, in some instances, parts our general concerns. Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have succeeded. At length a convention of the states has been assembled, they have formed a constitution which will now, probably, be submitted to the people to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power, to whom alone it of right belongs to make. The most important question that was ever proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you, and you are to decide upon it by men of your own election, chosen specially for this purpose. If the constitution, offered to your acceptance, be a wise one, calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of liberty, to secure the inestimable rights of mankind, and promote human happiness, then, if you accept it, you will lay a lasting foundation of happiness for millions.
The federalist 19 - the modes same subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union). The federalist 20 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union). The federalist 21 - other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton). The federalist 22 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton) (Other Defects of the Present Confederation). The federalist 23 - the necessity of a government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton). The federalist 24 - the powers Necessary to the common Defense further Considered (Hamilton). The federalist 25 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton) (The powers Necessary to the common Defense further Considered) The federalist 26 - the Idea of Restraining the legislative authority in Regard to the common Defense considered (Hamilton) The federalist 27 - the same subject Continued. To the citizens of the State of New-York. When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot.
- the Utility of the Union In Respect to revenue (Hamilton). The federalist 13 - advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in government (Hamilton). The federalist 14 - objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (M adison). The federalist 15 - the Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton). The federalist 16 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union). The federalist 17 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union). The federalist 18 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton and Madison) (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union).
The federalist 3 - the same subject with Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence). The federalist 4 - the same subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence). The federalist 5 - the same subject Continued (Jay) (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence). The federalist 6 - concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton). The federalist 7 - the same subject Continued (Hamilton) (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States). The federalist 8 - the consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton). The federalist 9 - the Union as a safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton).
Wikijunior:United States Charters of Freedom
Beginning on October 27, 1787 the federalist Papers were dates first published in the new York press under the signature of "Publius". These papers are generally considered to be one of the most important contributions to political thought made in America. The essays appeared in bookform in 1788, with an introduction by hamilton. Subsequently they were printed in manyeditions and translated to several languages. The pseudonym "Publius" was used by three man: jay, madison and Hamilton. Jay was responsible for only a few of the 85 articles. The papers were meant to be influential in the campaign for the adoption of the constitution by new York State. But the authors not only discussed the issues of the constitution, but also many general problems of politics. Introduction, the federalist 1 - general Introduction (Hamilton the federalist 2 - concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay).